

PSEC-KEM Specification
version 2.01

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History

version 2.01	2007/9/3	Compatible specification with ISO/IEC 18033-2. SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are added.
version 2.0	2007/6/14	Compatible specification with ISO/IEC 18033-2.
version 1.1	2002/5/14	Compatible specification with CRYPTREC recommended cipher.
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1 Introduction

This document provides a specification for implementing PSEC-KEM, which is a key encapsulation mechanism(KEM). We can utilize the mechanism for realizing key agreement schemes. This document covers the following issues:

- cryptographic primitives: KGP-PSEC
- key encapsulation mechanisms: ES-PSEC-KEM

This specification is compatible with the PSEC-KEM in ISO/IEC 18033-2 [1]. For the usage of KEM in the hybrid encryption applications, see [1].

2 Notation

bit	one of the two symbols 0 or 1.
bit string	an ordered sequence of bits.
octet	a bit strings of length 8.
octet string	an ordered sequence of octets.
\mathbf{R}	the set of real numbers.
\mathbf{Z}	the set of integers.
\mathbf{N}	the set of positive integers.
$a := b$	assign b to a .
\mathbb{F}_{q^m}	a finite field with q^m elements, where q is a prime.
\mathcal{O}	a point at infinity on an elliptic curve
$\langle B_0, B_1, \dots, B_{i-1} \rangle$	a bit string of length i , for example, $\langle 0, 1, 0, 0 \rangle$.
$\langle M_0, M_1, \dots, M_{i-1} \rangle$	an octet string of length i , for example, $\langle 170, 255, 0 \rangle$.
\parallel	a concatenation operator for two bit strings or for two octet strings, for example, $\langle 0, 1, 0, 0 \rangle \parallel \langle 1, 1, 0 \rangle = \langle 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0 \rangle$ for bit strings, $\langle 170, 255 \rangle \parallel \langle 0, 20 \rangle = \langle 170, 255, 0, 20 \rangle$ for octet strings. The operator is often omitted.
\oplus	the bit-wise exclusive-or operation
$\lceil y \rceil$	for $y \in \mathbf{R}$, the least integer greater than or equal to y .
$\lfloor y \rfloor$	for $y \in \mathbf{R}$, the greatest integer less than or equal to y .
$\text{GCD}(a, b)$	for $a \in \mathbf{N}$, $b \in \mathbf{N}$, the greatest common divisor of a and b .
$a b$	relation between integers a and b that holds if and only if a divides b , i.e., there exists an integer c such that $b = ac$.
$a \bmod m$	for $a \in \mathbf{Z}$, $m \in \mathbf{N}$, the least nonnegative integer b which satisfies $m (a - b)$.
$a^{-1} \bmod m$	for $a \in \mathbf{Z}$, $m \in \mathbf{N}$, the least nonnegative integer b which satisfies $ab \bmod m = 1$.

3 Data types and conversions

The schemes specified in this document involve operations using several different data types. Figure 1 illustrates which conversions are needed and where they are described.

3.1 Integer-to-BitString Conversion(I2BSP)

Integers should be converted to bit strings as described in this section. Informally, the idea is to represent the integer in binary. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{I2BSP}(x, l)$, is specified as




Figure 1: Conversion between data types

follows:

Input: x a nonnegative integer
 l the bit length of the output, a nonnegative integer
Output: B a bit string of length l
Errors: INVALID
Steps:

1. If $l = 0$, output an empty bit string and stop.
2. If $x \geq 2^l$, assert INVALID and stop.
3. Determine the x 's base-2 representation, $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ such that

$$x = x_{l-1}2^{l-1} + x_{l-2}2^{l-2} + \cdots + x_12 + x_0.$$

4. For $0 \leq i \leq l-1$, set $B_i := x_{l-1-i}$, and let

$$B := B_0B_1 \cdots B_{l-1}.$$

5. Output B .

3.2 BitString-to-Integer Conversion(BS2IP)

Bit strings should be converted to integers as described in this section. Informally, the idea is simply to view the bit string as the base-2 representation of the integer. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{BS2IP}(B)$, is specified as follows:

Input: B a bit string of length l

Output: x a nonnegative integer

Steps:

Convert $B = B_0B_1 \cdots B_{l-1}$ to an integer x as follows:

1. If $l = 0$, output 0 and stop.
2. View each B_i as an integer in $\{0, 1\}$, set $x_i := B_i$ for $0 \leq i \leq l - 1$, and let

$$x := \sum_{i=0}^{l-1} 2^{(l-1-i)} x_i.$$

3. Output x .

3.3 BitString-to-OctetString Conversion(BS2OSP)

Bit strings should be converted to octet strings as described in this section. Informally, the idea is to pad the bit string with 0's on the left to make its length a multiple of 8, then chop the result up into octets. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{BS2OSP}(B)$, is specified as follows:

Input: B a bit string of length l

Output: M an octet string of length $n = \left\lceil \frac{l}{8} \right\rceil$

Steps:

Convert the bit string $B = B_0B_1 \cdots B_{l-1}$ to an octet string $M = M_0M_1 \cdots M_{n-1}$ as follows:

1. If $l = 0$, output an empty octet string and stop.
2. For $j \in \{0, \dots, 8n - 1\}$, let:

$$\tilde{B}_j = \begin{cases} B_{j-(8n-\ell)} & \text{if } j \geq 8n - \ell, \\ 0 & \text{if } j < 8n - \ell. \end{cases}$$

3. For $i \in \{0, \dots, n - 1\}$, set:

$$M_i := \tilde{B}_{8i} \tilde{B}_{8i+1} \cdots \tilde{B}_{8i+7}$$

4. Output M .

3.4 OctetString-to-BitString Conversion(OS2BSP)

Octet strings should be converted to bit strings as described in this section. Informally, the idea is simply to view the octet string as a bit string. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{OS2BSP}(M)$, is specified as follows:

Input: M an octet string of length n
Output: B a bit string of length $l = 8n$
Steps:

Convert the octet string $M = M_0M_1 \cdots M_{n-1}$ to a bit string $B = B_0B_1 \cdots B_{\ell-1}$ as follows:

1. If $\ell = 0$, output an empty bit string and stop.
2. For $i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}, j \in \{0, \dots, 7\}$, determine $B_{8i+j} \in \{0, 1\}$ that satisfy

$$M_i = B_{8i}B_{8i+1} \cdots B_{8i+7}$$

3. Output B .

3.5 Integer-to-OctetString Conversion(I2OSP)

Integers should be converted to octet strings as described in this section. Informally, the idea is to represent the integer in binary and then convert the resulting bit string to an octet string. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{I2OSP}(x, n)$, is specified as follows:

Input: x a nonnegative integer
 n the octet length of output.
Output: M an octet string of length n
Errors: INVALID
Steps:

$$\text{BS2OSP}(\text{I2BSP}(x, 8n))$$

3.6 OctetString-to-Integer Conversion(OS2IP)

Octet strings should be converted to integers as described in this section. Informally, the idea is simply to view the octet string as the base-256 representation of the integer. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{OS2IP}(M)$, is specified as follows:

Input: M an octet string of length n
Output: x a nonnegative integer
Steps:

Convert $M = M_0M_1 \cdots M_{n-1}$ to an integer, x , as follows:

$$\text{BS2IP}(\text{OS2BSP}(M))$$

3.7 Field Element-to-Integer Conversion(FE2IP)

Field elements should be converted to integers as described in this section. A field element should be represented as a polynomial with integer coefficients, which can be represented as a sequence of the coefficients. Informally, the idea is simply to view the sequence of the coefficients as the radix- q representation of the integer, where q is the characteristic of the field. Formally, the conversion routine, FE2IP(\mathbf{a}), is specified as follows:

System parameters: \mathbb{F}_{q^m} a finite field with q^m elements where q is a prime, and $m > 0$ is an integer
Input: \mathbf{a} a field element in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
Output: x an integer in $\{0, \dots, q^m - 1\}$
Steps:

Convert field element \mathbf{a} to integer x as follows:

if $m = 1$:

Field element \mathbf{a} must be represented as an integer in $\{0, \dots, q - 1\}$.

1. Let $x := \mathbf{a}$.
2. Output x .

if $m > 1$:

Field element \mathbf{a} must be represented as a polynomial of at most $(m-1)$ -th degree with coefficients in $\{0, \dots, q - 1\}$. Let β be the variable of the polynomial.

1. Determine the coefficients $a_i \in \{0, \dots, q - 1\}$ for $i \in \{0, \dots, m - 1\}$ that satisfy

$$\mathbf{a} = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a_i \beta^i.$$

2. Compute

$$x := \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a_i q^i.$$

3. Output x .

3.8 Integer-to-Field Element Conversion(I2FEP)

Integers should be converted to field elements as described in this section. A field element should be represented as a polynomial with integer coefficients, and it can be represented as a sequence of the coefficients. Informally, the idea is to represent the integer with radix- q positional number system where q is the characteristic of the field, and then convert the each digit to the each coefficient of the polynomial. Formally, the conversion routine, I2FEP(x), is specified as follows:

System parameters: \mathbb{F}_{q^m} a finite field with q^m elements where q is a prime, and $m > 0$ is an integer
Input: x an integer in $\{0, \dots, q^m - 1\}$
Output: \mathbf{a} a field element in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
Steps:

Convert integer x to field element \mathbf{a} as follows:

if $m = 1$:

A field element of \mathbb{F}_{q^m} must be represented as an integer in $\{0, \dots, q - 1\}$.

1. Let $\mathbf{a} := x$.
2. Output \mathbf{a} .

if $m > 1$:

A field element of \mathbb{F}_{q^m} must be represented as a polynomial of at most $(m-1)$ -th degree with coefficients in $\{0, \dots, q-1\}$. Let β be the variable of the polynomial.

1. Expand x into its radix q representation $x_i \in \{0, \dots, q - 1\}$ for $i \in \{0, \dots, m - 1\}$ that satisfies

$$x = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} x_i q^i.$$

2. Compute

$$\mathbf{a} := \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} x_i \beta^i.$$

- 3: Output \mathbf{a} .

3.9 FieldElement-to-OctetString Conversion(FE2OSP)

The conversion routine, $\text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{a})$, is specified as follows:

System parameters: \mathbb{F}_{q^m} a finite field with q^m elements where q is a prime, and $m > 0$ is an integer
 n an integer equivalent to $\left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil$
Input: \mathbf{a} a field element
Output: M an octet string
Steps:

1. Let

$$M := \text{I2OSP}(\text{FE2IP}(\mathbf{a}), n).$$

2. Output M .

3.10 OctetString-to-FieldElement Conversion(OS2FEP)

The conversion routine, $\text{OS2FEP}(M)$, is specified as follows:

Input: M an octet string
Output: \mathbf{a} a field element
Steps:

1. Let

$$\mathbf{a} := \text{I2FEP}(\text{OS2IP}(M)).$$

2. Output \mathbf{a} .

3.11 EllipticCurvePoint-to-OctetString Conversion (ECP2OSP)

Elliptic curve points should be converted to octet strings as described in this section. Informally the idea is that, if point compression is being used, the compressed y -coordinate is placed in the leftmost octet of the octet string along with an indication that point compression is on, and the x -coordinate is placed in the remainder of the octet string; otherwise if point compression is off, the leftmost octet indicates that point compression is off, and remainder of the octet string contains the x -coordinate followed by the y -coordinate. Formally, the conversion routine, $\text{ECP2OSP}_E(P, R)$, is specified as follows:

System parameters: E an elliptic curve parameter
Input: P a point on an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
 R Compressed, Uncompressed, or Hybrid
Output: M an octet string of length n

$$\text{where } \begin{cases} n = 1 & \text{if } P = \mathcal{O}, \\ n = \left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil + 1 & \text{if } P \neq \mathcal{O} \text{ and } R \text{ is Compressed,} \\ n = 2 \left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil + 1 & \text{if } P \neq \mathcal{O} \text{ and } R \text{ is Uncompressed or Hybrid.} \end{cases}$$

Steps:

Convert P to an octet string $M = M_0 M_1 \cdots M_{n-1}$ as follows:

1. If $P = \mathcal{O}$, output $M := \text{I2OSP}(0, 1)$.
2. If $P = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \neq \mathcal{O}$ and $R = \text{Compressed}$, proceed as follows:
 - 2.1. Set octet string $X := \text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{x})$.
 - 2.2. Derive from \mathbf{y} a single bit \tilde{y} as follows (this allows the y -coordinate to be represented compactly using a single bit):
 - 2.2.1. If q is an odd number, set $\tilde{y} := 0$ if $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{0}$, set $\tilde{y} := y_i \bmod 2$ if $\mathbf{y} \neq \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{y} = y_{m-1}\beta^{m-1} + \cdots + y_1\beta + y_0$, and i is the smallest integer such that $y_i \neq 0$.
 - 2.2.2. If $q = 2$, set $\tilde{y} := 0$ if $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, otherwise compute $\mathbf{z} = z_{m-1}\beta^{m-1} + \cdots + z_1\beta + z_0$ such that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y}\mathbf{x}^{-1}$ and set $\tilde{y} := z_0$.
 - 2.3. If $\tilde{y} = 0$, assign the value $\text{I2OSP}(2, 1)$ to the single octet L . If $\tilde{y} = 1$, assign the value $\text{I2OSP}(3, 1)$ to the single octet L .
 - 2.4. Output $M := L \parallel X$.
3. If $P = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \neq \mathcal{O}$ and $R = \text{Uncompressed}$, proceed as follows:
 - 3.1. Set octet string $X := \text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{x})$.
 - 3.2. Set octet string $Y := \text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{y})$.
 - 3.3. Output $M := \text{I2OSP}(4, 1) \parallel X \parallel Y$.
4. If $P = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \neq \mathcal{O}$ and $R = \text{Hybrid}$, proceed as follows:
 - 4.1. Set octet string $X := \text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{x})$.
 - 4.2. Set octet string $Y := \text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{y})$.
 - 4.3. Derive from \mathbf{y} a single bit \tilde{y} as follows (this allows the y -coordinate to be represented compactly using a single bit):

- 4.3.1. If q is an odd number, set $\tilde{y} := 0$ if $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{0}$, set $\tilde{y} := y_i \bmod 2$ if $\mathbf{y} \neq \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{y} = y_{m-1}\beta^{m-1} + \dots + y_1\beta + y_0$, and i is the smallest integer such that $y_i \neq 0$.
- 4.3.2. If $q = 2$, set $\tilde{y} := 0$ if $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, otherwise compute $\mathbf{z} = z_{m-1}\beta^{m-1} + \dots + z_1\beta + z_0$ such that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y}\mathbf{x}^{-1}$ and set $\tilde{y} := z_0$.
- 4.4. If $\tilde{y} = 0$, assign the value I2OSP(6, 1) to the single octet L . If $\tilde{y} = 1$, assign the value I2OSP(7, 1) to the single octet L .
- 4.5. Output $M := L \parallel X \parallel Y$.

3.12 OctetString-to-EllipticCurvePoint Conversion(OS2ECP)

Octet strings should be converted to elliptic curve points as described in this section. Informally, the idea is that, if the octet string represents a compressed point, the compressed y -coordinate is recovered from the leftmost octet, the x -coordinate is recovered from the remainder of the octet string, and then the point compression process is reversed; otherwise the leftmost octet of the octet string is removed, the x -coordinate is recovered from the left half of the remaining octet string, and the y -coordinate is recovered from the right half of the remaining octet string. Formally, the conversion routine, OS2ECP(M), is specified as follows:

System parameters: E an elliptic curve parameter
Input: M an octet string that is either
the single octet,
an octet string of length $n = \left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil + 1$, or
an octet string of length $n = 2 \left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil + 1$
Output: P an elliptic curve point
Errors: INVALID
Steps:

Convert M to a point P on E as follows:

1. If $M = \text{I2OSP}(0, 1)$, output $P := \mathcal{O}$.
2. If M has length $\left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil + 1$ octets, proceed as follows:
 - 2.1. Parse $M = L \parallel X$ as a single octet L followed by $\left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil$ octets X .
 - 2.2. Set $\mathbf{x} := \text{OS2FEP}(X)$.
 - 2.3. If $L = \text{I2OSP}(2, 1)$, set $\tilde{y} := 0$, and if $L = \text{I2OSP}(3, 1)$, set $\tilde{y} := 1$. Otherwise assert INVALID and stop.
 - 2.4. Derive from \mathbf{x} and \tilde{y} elliptic curve point $P := (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$, where:
 - 2.4.1. If q is an odd number, compute the field element $\mathbf{w} := \mathbf{x}^3 + \mathbf{a}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{b}$, and compute a square root $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ of \mathbf{w} in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} . Assert INVALID and stop if there are no square roots in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} , set $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{0}$ if $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = \mathbf{0}$, otherwise set $\mathbf{y} := \boldsymbol{\gamma}$ if $\gamma_i \equiv \tilde{y} \bmod 2$, and set $\mathbf{y} := -\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ if $\gamma_i \not\equiv \tilde{y} \bmod 2$, where $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = \gamma_{m-1}\beta^{m-1} + \dots + \gamma_1\beta + \gamma_0$, and i is the smallest integer such that $\gamma_i \neq 0$.
 - 2.4.2. If $q = 2$ and $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, set $\mathbf{y} := \mathbf{b}^{2^{m-1}}$ in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} .

2.4.3. If $q = 2$ and $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{0}$, compute the field element $\gamma := \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b}\mathbf{x}^{-2}$ in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} , and find an element $\mathbf{z} = z_{m-1}\beta^{m-1} + \dots + z_1\beta + z_0$ such that $\mathbf{z}^2 + \mathbf{z} = \gamma$ in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} . Assert `INVALID` and stop if no such \mathbf{z} exists, otherwise set $\mathbf{y} := \mathbf{x}\mathbf{z}$ in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} if $z_0 = \tilde{y}$, and set $\mathbf{y} := \mathbf{x}(\mathbf{z} + \mathbf{1})$ in \mathbb{F}_{q^m} if $z_0 \neq \tilde{y}$.

2.5. Output $P := (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$.

3. If M has length $2 \left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil + 1$ octets, proceed as follows:

3.1. Parse $M = L \parallel X \parallel Y$ as a single octet L followed by $\left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil$ octets X followed by $\left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil$ octets Y .

3.2. Check that $L = \text{I2OSP}(4, 1)$ or $\text{I2OSP}(6, 1)$ or $\text{I2OSP}(7, 1)$. If $L \neq \text{I2OSP}(4, 1)$ or $\text{I2OSP}(6, 1)$ or $\text{I2OSP}(7, 1)$, assert `INVALID` and stop.

3.3. Set $\mathbf{x} := \text{OS2FEP}(X)$.

3.4. Set $\mathbf{y} := \text{OS2FEP}(Y)$.

3.5. If $P := (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ does not satisfy the defining equation of elliptic curve E , then assert `INVALID` and stop.

3.6. Output $P := (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$.

3.13 Partial EllipticCurvePoint-to-OctetString Conversion (PECP2OSP)

System parameters: E an elliptic curve parameter

Input: P a point on an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_{q^m}

Output: M an octet string of length $n = \left\lceil \frac{m \log_2 q}{8} \right\rceil$.

Steps:

Convert P to an octet string $M = M_0 M_1 \dots M_{n-1}$ as follows:

1. If $P = \mathcal{O}$, output $M := \text{I2OSP}(0, n)$.
2. If $P = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \neq \mathcal{O}$, output $\text{FE2OSP}(\mathbf{x})$.

4 Key types

In this section, two types of keys are defined: PSEC-KEM system parameters, PSEC-KEM private key and PSEC-KEM public key.

4.1 PSEC-KEM system parameters

A PSEC-KEM system parameters are the following value:

- E , an elliptic curve parameter
- KDF , the choice from key derivation functions
- $hLen$, a nonnegative integer
- $keyLen$, a nonnegative integer

An elliptic curve parameter E is the 9-tuple $(q, m, f(\beta), \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, P, p, pLen, qmLen)$, where the components have the following meanings:

- q , a prime number
- m , a positive integer
- $f(\beta)$, a monic irreducible polynomial of degree m over \mathbb{F}_q
- \mathbf{a} , an element in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
- \mathbf{b} , an element in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
- P , a point on an elliptic curve
 - \mathbf{x} , an element in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
 - \mathbf{y} , an element in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}
$$\mathbf{y}^2 = \mathbf{x}^3 + \mathbf{a}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{b} \quad (q > 3)$$

$$\mathbf{y}^2 + \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x}^3 + \mathbf{a}\mathbf{x}^2 + \mathbf{b} \quad (q = 2)$$
- p , a prime, the order of P
- $pLen$, the value of $\lceil \log_{256} p \rceil$
- $qmLen$, the value of $\lceil \log_{256} q^m \rceil$

4.2 PSEC-KEM private key

A PSEC-KEM private key is the following value:

- s , a nonnegative integer

4.3 PSEC-KEM public key

A PSEC-KEM public key is the following value:

- W , a point on E

Valid PSEC-KEM public key $W = sP$ holds, where s is an element in PSEC-KEM private key as described in Section 4.2 and W is a PSEC-KEM public key as described in Section 4.3.

Note: KDF shall be one of the key derivation functions in Section 6.2.

5 Key encapsulation mechanisms

A key encapsulation mechanism works just like a public-key encryption scheme, except that the encryption algorithm takes no input other than the recipient's public key. Instead, the encryption algorithm generates a pair (k, c_0) , where k is an octet string of some specified length, and c_0 is an encryption of k , that is, the decryption algorithm applied to c_0 yields k .

One can always use a public-key encryption scheme for this purpose, generating a random octet string, and then encrypting it under the recipient's public key. However, as we shall see, one can construct a key encapsulation scheme in other, more efficient, ways as well.

PSEC-KEM consists of two operations.

- The encryption operation $\text{ES-PSEC-KEM-ENCRYPT}(PK, R)$ that takes as input public key PK and outputs ciphertext/key pair (c_0, k) .
- The decryption operation $\text{ES-PSEC-KEM-DECRYPT}(PK, s, c_0)$ that takes as input public key PK , private key s and ciphertext c_0 , and outputs key k .

5.1 KGP-PSEC

$\text{KGP-PSEC}()$ is defined as follows:

- Input:** KGP-PSEC takes no input
- Output:** W PSEC-KEM public key
 s PSEC-KEM private key, a nonnegative integer, $0 \leq s < p$
- Steps:**
1. Generate a random integer $s \in \{0, \dots, p-1\}$.
 2. Let $W := sP$.
 3. Output W and s .

5.2 ES-PSEC-KEM

5.2.1 Encryption operation

$\text{ES-PSEC-KEM-ENCRYPT}(PK, R)$ is defined as follows:

- Input:** W PSEC-KEM public key
 R Compressed, Uncompressed, or Hybrid
- Output:** k an octet string
 c_0 an octet string
- Assumptions:** public key PK is valid.
- Steps:**
1. Generate a random octet string $r \in \{0, \dots, 255\}^{hLen}$.
 2. Let $H := \text{KDF}(\text{I2OSP}(0, 4) \parallel r, pLen + 16 + keyLen)$.
 3. Parse $H = t \parallel k$, where the octet length of t is $pLen + 16$; the octet length of k is $keyLen$.
 4. Let $\alpha := \text{OS2IP}(t) \bmod p$.
 5. Let $C_1 := \alpha P$.
 6. Let $Q := \alpha W$.
 7. Let $c_2 := r \oplus \text{KDF}(\text{I2OSP}(1, 4) \parallel \text{ECP2OSP}(C_1, R) \parallel \text{PECP2OSP}(Q), hLen)$.
 8. Let $c_0 := \text{ECP2OSP}(C_1, R) \parallel c_2$.
 9. Output (k, c_0) .

5.2.2 Decryption operation

ES-PSEC-KEM-DECRYPT(PK, s, c_0) is defined as follows:

Input: PK PSEC-KEM public key
 s PSEC-KEM private key, a nonnegative integer, $0 \leq s < p$
 c_0 an octet string
Output: k an octet string
Errors: INVALID
Assumptions: public key PK and private key s are valid.
Steps:

1. If the octet length of c_0 is less than or equal to $hLen$, assert INVALID and stop.
2. Parse $c_0 = g \parallel c_2$, where g and c_2 are octet strings such that the octet length of c_2 is $hLen$.
3. Let $C_1 := \text{OS2ECPP}(g)$.
If OS2ECPP asserts INVALID, assert INVALID and stop.
4. Let $Q := sC_1$.
5. Let $r := c_2 \oplus \text{KDF}(\text{I2OSP}(1, 4) \parallel g \parallel \text{PECP2OSP}(Q), hLen)$.
6. Let $h := \text{KDF}(\text{I2OSP}(0, 4) \parallel r, pLen + 16 + keyLen)$.
7. Parse $h = t \parallel k$, where the octet length of t is $pLen + 16$; the octet length of k is $keyLen$.
8. Let $\alpha := \text{OS2IP}(t) \bmod p$.
then assert INVALID and stop.
9. Check $C_1 := \alpha P$.
If it holds, output k . Otherwise, assert INVALID and stop.

6 Auxiliary techniques

This section gives several examples of the techniques that support the functions described in this document.

6.1 Allowable Hash functions

The allowable hash functions are SHA-1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 described in ISO/IEC 10118-3 [2].

6.2 Allowable Key derivation functions

MGF1 [3] is recommended. MGF1 is the same as KDF1 in [1].

6.2.1 MGF1

MGF1 is a mask generation function based on a hash function.

MGF1(M, n) is defined as follows:

System parameters: *Hash* hash function
hashLen length in octets of the hash function output, a positive integer

Input: *M* seed from which mask is generated, an octet string
n the octet length of the output, a positive integer

Output: *mask* mask, an octet string of length n

Errors: INVALID

Steps:

1. Let n_0 be the octetlength of M . If $n_0 + 4$ is greater than the input limitation for the hash function, assert INVALID and stop.
2. Let $cThreshold := \left\lceil \frac{n}{hashLen} \right\rceil$.
3. If $cThreshold > 2^{32}$, assert INVALID and stop.
4. Let M' be the empty octet string.
5. Let $counter := 0$.

(a) Convert the integer $counter$ to an octet string C of length 4 octets:

$$C := I2OSP(counter, 4).$$

(b) Concatenate M and C , and apply the hash function to the result to produce a hash value H of length $hashLen$ octets:

$$H := Hash(M \parallel C).$$

(c) Concatenate M' and H to the octet string M' :

$$M' := M' \parallel H.$$

(d) Let $counter := counter + 1$. If $counter < cThreshold$, go back to step 5a.

6. Let $mask$ be the leftmost n octets of the octet string M' :

$$mask := M'_0 M'_1 \cdots M'_{n-1}.$$

7. Output $mask$.

References

- [1] ISO/IEC 18033 – Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption algorithms – Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers, ISO, 2005a.
- [2] ISO/IEC 10118 – Information technology – Security techniques – Hash functions – Part 3: Dedicated Hash functions, ISO, 2004.
- [3] RSA Laboratories, “PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Encryption Standard,” draft 2, January 5, 2001.

Appendix

A Security requirements of parameters

Security requirements of PSEC-KEM parameters are the following:

$$\begin{aligned} pLen &\geq 20 \\ hLen &\geq 16 \end{aligned}$$

B Recommended values of parameters

Recommended values of PSEC-KEM parameters are the following:

$$\begin{aligned} pLen &\geq 28 && (224bit) \\ KDF &= \text{MGF1}(\text{SHA-256}, hashLen = 32) \\ hLen &= 32 \\ R &= \text{Compressed} \\ keyLen &= 32 && (256bit) \end{aligned}$$

C ASN.1 Syntax

```
--#####
ntt-ds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    itu-t(0) networkoperator(3) ntt(4401) ds(5) }
id-PSEC-KEM-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ntt-ds 3 1 8 }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All; --
IMPORTS
BlockAlgorithms
FROM EncryptionAlgorithms-3 { iso(1) standard(0)
encryption-algorithms(18033) part(3)
asn1-module(0) algorithm-object-identifiers(0) }
HashFunctionAlgs, id-sha1, NullParms
FROM DedicatedHashFunctions { iso(1) standard(0)
hash-functions(10118) part(3) asn1-module(1)
dedicated-hash-functions(0) };
--#####
-- oid definitions
OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- alias
-- Synonyms --
is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2)}
id-ac OID ::= { is18033-2 asymmetric-cipher(1) }
id-kem OID ::= { is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) }
id-dem OID ::= { is18033-2 data-encapsulation-mechanism(3) }
id-sc OID ::= { is18033-2 symmetric-cipher(4) }
id-kdf OID ::= { is18033-2 key-derivation-function(5) }
```

```

id-rem OID ::= { is18033-2 rsa-encoding-method(6) }
id-hem OID ::= { is18033-2 himer-encoding-method(7) }
id-ft OID ::= { is18033-2 field-type(8) }
-- Key encapsulation mechanisms --
id-kem-psec OID ::= { id-kem psec(2) }
-- Data encapsulation mechanisms --
id-dem-dem1 OID ::= { id-dem dem1(1) }
id-dem-dem2 OID ::= { id-dem dem2(2) }
id-dem-dem3 OID ::= { id-dem dem3(3) }
-- Symmetric ciphers --
id-sc-sc1 OID ::= { id-sc sc1(1) }
id-sc-sc2 OID ::= { id-sc sc2(2) }
-- Key derivation functions --
id-kdf-kdf1 OID ::= { id-kdf kdf1(1) }
id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { id-kdf kdf2(2) }
-- new field types oids
-- id-ft-prime-field OID ::= { id-ft prime-field(1) }
-- used only to define new basis type
id-ft-characteristic-two OID ::= { id-ft characteristic-two(2) }
id-ft-odd-characteristic OID ::= { id-ft odd-characteristic(3) }
id-ft-characteristic-two-basis OID ::=
{ id-ft-characteristic-two basisType(1) }
charTwoPolynomialBasis OID ::=
{ id-ft-characteristic-two-basis
charTwoPolynomialBasis(1) }
id-ft-odd-characteristic-basis OID ::= { id-ft-odd-characteristic
basisType(1)}
oddCharPolynomialBasis OID ::= {id-ft-odd-characteristic-basis
oddCharPolynomialBasis(1)}
-- MGF1 in PKCS #1 is equivalent to KDF1 here
-- id-mgf1 should be used instead of id-kdf-kdf1 for compatibility
-- with existing implementations
alg-mgf1-sha1 RsaesKeyDerivationFunction ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1,
parameters HashFunction : alg-sha1
}
alg-sha1 HashFunction ::= {
algorithm id-sha1,
parameters NullParms : NULL
}
pkcs-1 OID ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1}
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-1 8}
id-itu-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
id-itu-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {{ joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-itu-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)

```

```

country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-itu-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-itu-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
id-camellia128-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) camellia128-cbc(2)
id-aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)_nistAlgorithms(4) 1 }
id-aes128-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aes 2 }

```

```

--#####
-- KEM information objects
KeyEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ KEMAlgorithms }}
KEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
{ OID id-kem-psec PARMS PsecKemParameters } |
{ OID id-PSEC-KEM-v2 PARMS PsecKemParameters },
... -- Expect additional algorithms --
}
--#####
-- PSEC-KEM
-- an element of the group given in PsecKemParameters (may be 0)
PsecKemPrivateKey ::= INTEGER
PsecKemPublicKey ::= FieldElement
PsecKemParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
group Group OPTIONAL,
keyDerivationFunction KeyDerivationFunction,
seedLength INTEGER (1..MAX),
keyLength KeyLength -- Length by byte
}
-- DEM specifications
DataEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ DEMAlgorithms }}
DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
{ OID id-dem-dem1 PARMS Dem1Parameters } |
{ OID id-dem-dem2 PARMS Dem2Parameters } |
{ OID id-dem-dem3 PARMS Dem3Parameters },
... -- Expect additional algorithms --
}
Dem1Parameters ::= SEQUENCE{
symmetricCipher SymmetricCipher,
mac MacAlgorithm
}
Dem2Parameters ::= SEQUENCE{
symmetricCipher SymmetricCipher,

```

```

mac MacAlgorithm,
labelLength INTEGER (0..MAX)
}
Dem3Parameters ::= SEQUENCE{
mac MacAlgorithm,
msgLength INTEGER (0..MAX)
}
--#####
-- finite field, group, and elliptic curve representations
Group ::= CHOICE {
groupOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
groupHashId OCTET STRING, -- defined in RFC2528
groupParameters GroupParameters
}
GroupParameters ::= CHOICE {
explicitFiniteFieldSubgroup
[0] ExplicitFiniteFieldSubgroupParameters,
ellipticCurveSubgroup
[1] EllipticCurveSubgroupParameters
}
ExplicitFiniteFieldSubgroupParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
fieldID FieldID {{FieldTypes}},
generator FieldElement,
subgroupOrder INTEGER,
subgroupIndex INTEGER
}
FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}),
parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType}) OPTIONAL
}
FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= {
{ Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } |
{ Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field }|
{ Odd-characteristic IDENTIFIED BY id-ft-odd-characteristic },
... -- expect additional field types
}
-- prime fieds
Prime-p ::= INTEGER
-- characteristic two fields
CHARACTERISTIC-TWO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- when basis is gnBasis then the basis shall be an optimal
-- normal basis of Type T where T is determined as follows:
-- if an ONB of Type 2 exists for the given value of m then
-- T shall be 2, otherwise if an ONB of Type 1 exists for the
-- given value of m then T shall be 1, otherwise T shall be
-- the least value for which an ONB of Type T exists for the
-- given value of m
-- when basis is gnBasis then m shall not be divisible by 8

```

```

-- note: the above rule is from ANSI X9.62
-- note: for the given m and T the ONB is unique
Characteristic-two ::= SEQUENCE {
m INTEGER,-- extension degree
basis CHARACTERISTIC-TWO.&id({BasisTypes}),
parameters CHARACTERISTIC-TWO.&Type({BasisTypes}{@basis})
}
BasisTypes CHARACTERISTIC-TWO ::= {
{ NULL IDENTIFIED BY gnBasis } |
{ Trinomial IDENTIFIED BY tpBasis } |
{ Pentanomial IDENTIFIED BY ppBasis } |
{ CharTwoPolynomial IDENTIFIED BY charTwoPolynomialBasis },
... -- expect additional basis types
}
Trinomial ::= INTEGER
Pentanomial ::= SEQUENCE {
k1 INTEGER,
k2 INTEGER,
k3 INTEGER
}
-- characteric two general irreducible polynomial representation
-- the irreducible polymial
--  $a(n)*x^n + a(n-1)*x^{(n-1)} + \dots + a(1)*x + a(0)$ 
-- is encoded in the bit string with a(n) in the first bit, the
-- following coefficients in the following bit positions and a(0)
-- in the last bit of the bit string (one could omit a(n) and a(0)
-- but it may be simpler and less error-prone to leave them in
-- the encoding)
-- the degree of the polynomial is to be inferred from the length
-- of the bit string
CharTwoPolynomial ::= BIT STRING
-- odd characteristic extension fields
ODD-CHARACTERISTIC ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
Odd-characteristic ::= SEQUENCE {
characteristic INTEGER(3..MAX),
degree INTEGER(2..MAX),
basis ODD-CHARACTERISTIC.&id({OddCharBasisTypes}),
parameters ODD-CHARACTERISTIC.&Type({OddCharBasisTypes}{@basis})
}
OddCharBasisTypes ODD-CHARACTERISTIC ::= {
{ OddCharPolynomial IDENTIFIED BY oddCharPolynomialBasis },
... -- expect additional basis types
}
-- the monic irreducible polynomial is encoded as follows
-- the leading coefficient is ignored
-- the remaining coefficients define an element of the finite field
-- which is encoded in an octet string using FE2OSP
OddCharPolynomial ::= FieldElement
EllipticCurveSubgroupParameters ::= SEQUENCE {

```

```

version INTEGER { ecpVer1(1) } (ecpVer1),
fieldID FieldID {{ FieldTypes }},
curve Curve,
generator ECPPoint,    -- Base point G
subgroupOrder INTEGER, -- Order mu of the base point
subgroupIndex INTEGER, -- The integer nu = #E(F)/mu
...
}
Curve ::= SEQUENCE {
aCoeff FieldElement,
bCoeff FieldElement,
seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}
--#####
-- auxiliary definitions
FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING -- obtained through FE2OSP
ECPPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- obtained through EC2OSP
KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
MacAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ MACAlgorithms }}
MACAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
{ OID hmac-sha1 PARMS NULL } ,
... -- Expect additional algorithms --
}
HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ HashFunctionAlgorithms }}
HashFunctionAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
  HashFunctionAlgs | -- from 10118-3
  { NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-itu-sha1 } |
  { NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-itu-sha224 } |
  { NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-itu-sha256 } |
  { NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-itu-sha384 } |
  { NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-itu-sha512 },
... -- expect additional algorithms
}
KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ KDFAlgorithms }}
KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
{ OID id-kdf-kdf1 PARMS HashFunction } |
{ OID id-kdf-kdf2 PARMS HashFunction } |
{ OID id-mgf1 PARMS HashFunction },
... -- Expect additional algorithms --
}
SymmetricCipher ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ SymmetricAlgorithms }}
SymmetricAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
{ OID id-sc-sc1 PARMS BlockCipher } |
{ OID id-sc-sc2 PARMS BlockCipher } |
{ OID id-camellia128-cbc PARMS BlockCipher } |
{ OID id-aes128-CBC PARMS BlockCipher },
... -- Expect additional algorithms --
}
BlockCipher ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ BlockAlgorithms }}

```

```

--#####
-- external OIDs
-- HMAC-SHA1
hMAC-SHA1 OID ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) 8 1 2 }
-- X9.62 finite field and basis types
ansi-X9-62 OID ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
id-fieldType OID ::= { ansi-X9-62 fieldType(1) }
prime-field OID ::= { id-fieldType 1 }
characteristic-two-field OID ::= { id-fieldType 2 }
-- characteristic two basis
id-characteristic-two-basis OID ::= { characteristic-two-field
basisType(3) }
gnBasis OID ::= { id-characteristic-two-basis 1 }
tpBasis OID ::= { id-characteristic-two-basis 2 }
ppBasis OID ::= { id-characteristic-two-basis 3 }
--#####
-- Cryptographic algorithm identification --
ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL
}
WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] }
AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm ALGORITHM.&id( {IOSet} ),
parameters ALGORITHM.&Type( {IOSet}{@algorithm} ) OPTIONAL
}
END -- EncryptionAlgorithms-2 --

```